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I. INTRODUCTION
In his recent article, James Lawrence introduced many of us to an
emerging form of appropriate dispute resolution-collaborative lawyering. 1
The collaborative law approach uses attorneys in a nonadversarial capacity
to negotiate with the parties to achieve settlement. 2 Collaborative law's
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University. I would like to thank the Editorial Board of the JDR for the opportunity to
present this Comment. I also thank my colleague, Marc Spindelman, for his helpful
comments, and my research assistant, Michael Beaver, for his efficient help on this
project.
1 James K.L. Lawrence, Collaborative Lawyering: A New Development in Conflict
Resolution, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 431, 431-32 (2002). The origins of
collaborative law can be traced to Stuart Webb, a Minnesota family law practitioner who,
in 1990, rejected the adversarial nature of his practice and began experimenting with
other trusted lawyers to achieve settlements in family law cases through nonadversarial
collaboration with the parties. Douglas C. Reynolds & Doris F. Tennant, Collaborative
Law-An Emerging Practice, BOSTON B.J., Nov./Dec. 2001, at 12. While collaborative
law has proven most successful in the family law context, it has recently spread to all
types of disputes. See Robert W. Rack, Jr., Settle or Withdraw: Collaborative Lawyering
Provides Incentive to Avoid Costly Litigation, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 1998, at 9,
10 (noting that family lawyers have taken the collaborative law lead, but recognizing
emerging groups in environmental, personal injury, employment, and corporation law).
As of 2001, collaborative law groups now exist in at least 20 states. Reynolds & Tennant,
supra, at 12 n.6. Texas has recently given statutory recognition to collaborative law. See
TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 6.603 (authorizing the use of collaborative law in marriage
dissolution), 153.0072 (permitting the use of collaborative law in suits affecting parent-
child relationships) (Vernon 2002). Specific courts have also explicitly authorized use of
collaborative law. See HAMILTON COUNTY CT. C. P. R. 43 (authorizing collaborative law
by local rule in an Ohio court).
2 Lawrence, supra note 1, at 432 (describing the collaborative law process); see Tom
Arnold, Collaborative Dispute Resolution: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, at
http://www.mediate.com/articles/amold.cfin (last visited Nov. 19, 2002) (describing
collaborative law as when "the parties agree to scrap the idea of the adversarial system of
law, and to work at every phase of their dispute resolution process in a collaborative,
cooperative mode to resolve the dispute"); Chip Rose, Principles and Guidelines for the
Practice of Collaborative Law, at http://www.mediate.com/articles/rosel.cfm (last
visited Nov. 19, 2002) (describing the nonadversarial collaborative law process in the
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unique twist is that counsel participates solely for settlement purposes,
thereby increasing the stakes for participants in reaching agreement and
diluting the litigation threat.3  Because the collaborative lawyer's
"responsibilities shift away from those associated with 'pure' advocacy and
toward the creative, flexible representation that characterizes neutrality,"4
Lawrence contends that the collaborative lawyer falls in a "unique ethical
position" somewhere between the ethical posture of a traditional advocate
and a neutral. 5
Judge Sandra Beckwith and practitioner Sherri Goren Slovin flatly
disagree. 6 Describing Lawrence's approach as an "unduly complicated
starting point,"' 7 Beckwith and Slovin reject the premise that "the
collaborative lawyer wears a third hat, distinct from the traditional lawyer's
and the neutral's."8 Rather, the collaborative lawyer's ethical responsibilities
"lie at the advocacy extreme."9 According to Beckwith and Slovin, "[t]he
collaborative lawyer has not taken off his advocacy hat or donned the hat of
neutrality."'10
What gives rise to this sharp split in ethical perspective by these ADR
proponents well steeped in the collaborative law process?" 1 An answer lies
context of family law); Collaborative Law Institute, What is Collaborative Law?, at
http://www.collaborativelaw.org/whatis.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2002) (defining
collaborative law as "resolving conflict using cooperative strategies rather than
adversarial techniques and litigation").
3 Lawrence, supra note 1, at 432 (describing the limitation on counsel who are
participating for settlement purposes only and the corresponding increased incentive to
achieve settlement).
4 Id. at 442.
5 Id. at 439.
6 See Sandra S. Beckwith & Sherri Goren Slovin, The Collaborative Lawyer as
Advocate: A Response, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 497, 498 (2003).
7Id. at 502.
8 Id. at 498. Beckwith & Slovin similarly reject the notion that the collaborative
lawyer wears both hats simultaneously. Id.
9 Id. at 501.
10 Id. at 503.
II Both Lawrence and Beckwith serve on the Board of Trustees of The
Collaborative Law Center in Cincinnati, Ohio. Lawrence, supra note 1, at 431; Beckwith
& Slovin, supra note 6, at 469 n. 1. Slovin chairs the Collaborative Law Center's Family
Section. Id. at 469 n.2. The Cincinnati group is recognized as leading the expansion of
collaborative lawyering to practice areas outside of family law. Tom Arnold,
Collaborative Dispute Resolution-An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, in ALI-ABA
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in placing their disagreement within the context of the larger on-going
conversation on the merits of different ethical guidelines for ADR
participants. Beckwith and Slovin are correct in that currently a lawyer's
conduct in a collaborative law settlement might be evaluated against the
ethical standards embodied in a specific jurisdiction's ethical code, typically
one based on the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 12 The Model
Rules certainly contemplate that as an "advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts
the client's position under the rules of the adversary system."'13 While the
process of collaborative lawyering could certainly be forced into this ethical
scheme, should it be? Beckwith and Slovin's view is that it should.
Lawrence, however, recognizes the difficulty in shackling a new cooperative
paradigm to existing ethical rules that were forged and fitted to the
adversarial system. 14 Hence, the Lawrence-Beckwith/Slovin exchange is
really part of a broader debate: should ADR have its own ethical rules? The
on-going discussions concerning the proper ethical treatment of third-party
neutrals, party-appointed arbitrators, and party representatives in mediation
provide guidance. The central lesson from these dialogues is that separate
Course of Study Materials: ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: HOW TO USE IT TO YOUR
ADVANTAGE 379, 389 (Oct. 2000).
12 Forty-two states and the District of Columbia have rules based upon the Model
Rules. Georgia is the most recent convert, adopting new rules based on the Model Rules
effective January 1, 2001. Only a handful of states (Iowa, Maine, Nebraska, New York,
Ohio, Oregon, and Tennessee) retain professional rules based on the older Model Code
of Professional Responsibility [hereinafter Model Code]. However, New York and
Oregon have incorporated some Model Rules provisions into their respective codes. See
ABA/BNA LAW. MANUAL ON PROF'L CONDUCT, 01:3-01:4 (2002). California's unique
rules follow neither the Model Code nor Model Rules. Id.
While there is a wide array of rules adopted by the federal district courts, ethical
codes based on the Model Rules predominate:
Forty-eight districts... have adopted state court rules based on [the Model
Rules]; twelve districts adopted state rules based [on the Model Code]; ten districts
have adopted the ABA's Model Code or Model Rules directly and not their
respective state's amended version; ten districts have adopted simultaneously both
an ABA model and their own state's rules; eleven districts have not adopted any
rule, although some of those districts have confusing standing orders about the
district's policy.
Andrew L. Kaufman, Who Should Make the Rules Governing Conduct of Lawyers in
Federal Matters, 75 TUL. L. REV. 149, 150 (2000).
13 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 2 (2002).
14 See Lawrence, supra note 1, at 438-42 (comparing the ethical orientation of the
collaborative lawyer with that of a traditional advocate and neutral). Lawrence, however,
stops short of advocating a separate ethical code for collaborative lawyers.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
treatment may be warranted. While I risk becoming an ethical milliner, 15
why should we put old ethical hats on the new heads embracing the
collaborative paradigm? We should not.
II. LESSONS FROM OTHER ADR ETHICS DIALOGUES
A. The Model Rules and the Third-Party Neutral Experience
The questions of where on the ethical spectrum attorneys practicing
ADR properly fit and whether separate ethical guidelines should control
their conduct are certainly not new. Since the promulgation of the Model
Rules in 1983, both the use and acceptance of ADR have rapidly
expanded.' 6 However, when the Model Rules were drafted, even the two
most prevalent forms of ADR, arbitration and mediation, 17 were essentially
unknown outside of a few narrow practice sectors.18 Not surprisingly, the
Model Rules as drafted provided little guidance to lawyers participating in
15 1 would much prefer being an ethical vintner, but Professor Kimberlee Kovach
already cornered that market. See Kimberlee K. Kovach, New Wine Requires New
Wineskins: Transforming Lawyer Ethics for Effective Representation in a Non-
Adversarial Approach to Problem Solving: Mediation, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 935, 935
(2001) [hereinafter New Wine] (titling her piece appropriately). Because Beckwith and
Slovin introduce the hat analogy, I will stick with that. On a lighter note: "What did the
hat rack say to the hat? You go on a head, and I'll stay right here." Telephone Interview
with Laura J. Fairman, Wife, Austin, Tx. (Oct. 8, 2002) (following revelation of this
Comment's title).
16 See Douglas H. Yarn, Lawyer Ethics in ADR and the Recommendations of Ethics
2000 to Revise the Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Considerations for Adoption
and State Application, 54 ARK. L. REv. 207, 210-11 (2001) (highlighting the explosion
of ADR use and acceptance, especially court-connected programs, since the mid-1970s);
Nancy H. Rogers & Craig A. McEwen, Employing the Law to Increase the Use of
Mediation and to Encourage Direct and Early Negotiations, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP.
REsOL. 831, 832-33 (1998) (noting the current participation in and acceptance of
mediation despite its rare use only twenty years ago).
17 Robert P. Bums, Some Ethical Issues Surrounding Mediation, 70 FORDHAM L.
REV. 691, 691 (2001) ("Mediation is now the preferred method of 'alternative dispute
resolution' ... "); Joseph B. Stulberg, Mediation: The Rule, Not the Exception,
EXPERIENCE, Spr. 2002, at 38, 38 (describing mediation as a "significant component" of
our judicial system).
18 Yam, supra note 16, at 212 (describing arbitration and mediation as "barely on
the legal ethics radar screen" except for specific commercial sectors, labor, and
neighborhood or domestic disputes when the Model Rules were adopted).
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ADR. 19 Instead, they reflected the then dominant paradigm: lawyers are
advocates in an adversarial system.20
This orientation proved problematic for attorney third-party neutrals
who, representing no one in particular, still operated under the rubric of the
Model Rules. 21 Commentators in the ADR field repeatedly pointed out this
and other deficiencies in the state ethical codes as applied to appropriate
dispute resolution. 22 Professional organizations and ADR providers tried to
19 See id. (noting dearth of direction from current ethics regimes); see also infra
note 22.
20 See Yarn, supra note 16, at 212 ("[T]he Model Rules reflected the common
conceptual paradigm of the lawyer as advocate in an adversary adjudicative system of
dispute resolution.").
21 See id. ("This [adversarial] orientation in the Model Code and Model Rules has
caused considerable confusion when considering the actions of lawyer-neutrals who do
not represent anyone."); John D. Feerick, Standards of Conduct for Mediators,
JUDICATURE, May-June 1996, at 317 ("[T]o what extent a lawyer-mediator is subject to
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct is unclear... "). For example, former Rule 2.2
dealing with a lawyer acting as an intermediary between two clients is both inapplicable
on its face and confusing when applied by analogy. Id. This rule was recently deleted
from the Model Rules. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.2 (2001), with
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1-2.3 (2002). As for arbitrators, they were only
mentioned in Rule 1.12 along with former judges for conflicts purposes. See MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.12 (200 1).
22 See, e.g., Kimberlee K. Kovach, Good Faith in Mediation-Requested,
Recommended, or Required? A New Ethic, 38 S. TEX. L. REv. 575, 604 (1997)
[hereinafter Good Faith] (explaining the need for new, specific rules to counter the
current, pervasive adversarial models); Maureen E. Laflin, Preserving the Integrity of
Mediation Through the Adoption of Ethical Rules for Lawyer-Mediators, 14 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 479, 499 (2000) (calling application of the Model Code
and Model Rules to mediation "murky"); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative
Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No Answers From the Adversary Conception of
Lawyers'Responsibilities, 38 S. TEx. L. REv. 407, 410 (1997) [hereinafter Ethics] ("I do
not believe any of the currently drafted rule systems ... provide adequate guidance for
modem 'ethical' dilemmas facing lawyers, parties, clients and neutrals in the wide variety
of ADR processes."); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Silences of the Restatement of the
Law Governing Lawyers: Lawyering as Only Adversary Practice, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 631, 637-38 (1997) [hereinafter Silences] ("[Clommon ADR practices probably
will not be adequately dealt with by the current rule configurations."); Diane K. Vescovo
et al., Essay--Ethical Dilemmas in Mediation, 31 U. MEM. L. REv. 59, 61 (2000) (noting
Model Rules do not deal with ethical issues raised by mediators). But see Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., Non-silences of Professor Hazard on "The Silences of the Restatement": A
Response to Professor Menkel-Meadow, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 671, 673-74 (1997)
(advocating adoption of a version of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct to cover third-
party neutrals).
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take up the slack by drafting their own stand-alone ethical guidelines. 23
Amazingly, it was not until last year that recognition of the most basic form
of appropriate dispute resolution-use of a third-party neutral-found its
way into the Model Rules. As a result of the work of the Ethics 2000
Commission,24 the ABA formally amended the Model Rules in February
2002 to include specific reference to third-party neutrals.25
In what has been called "the single most important" revision,26 the
preamble to the Model Rules now recognizes that, in addition to
representational functions, lawyers may serve in nonrepresentational roles as
third-party neutrals.27 Additionally, a new Rule 2.4 was created specifically
governing lawyers serving as third-party neutrals.28 This new rule defines
23 By 1996, there were at least 100 mediation codes of conduct. Feerick, supra note
21, at 315. There are also numerous codes of ethics for arbitration created by professional
organizations and providers. See infra notes 36, 60-61 and accompanying text
(discussing arbitration ethics codes). The guidance provided by mediation and arbitration
ethical codes has been mixed. For example, the AAA/ABA's Code of Ethics for
Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes is widely used by both arbitrators and arbitral
institutions. See John D. Feerick, The 1977 Code of Ethics for Arbitrators: An Outside
Perspective, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 907, 907 (2002). In contrast, the Ethical Standards of
Professional Responsibility promulgated in 1986 by the now-defunct Society of
Professionals in Dispute Resolution ("SPIDR") has faded into oblivion. See Yam, supra
note 16, at 214. SPIDR has since merged into the Association for Conflict Resolution.
See Association for Conflict Resolution, at http://www.acresolution.org (last visited Nov.
25, 2002).
24 In 1997, the ABA Board of Governors appointed a thirteen-member Commission
on Evaluation of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. This commission is more
commonly known as the Ethics 2000 Commission. The Ethics 2000 Commission was
charged with reviewing the Model Rules and proposing revisions. After three years of
work, the commission released its 400-page report in November 2000. A complete text of
the Ethics 2000 report is available at www.abanet.org/cpr/ethics2k/html.
25 The Ethics 2000 report with its proposed changes to the Model Rules was
presented to the ABA House of Delegates at its August 2001 meeting. The House voted
on some of the proposed rules. The House completed its deliberations at its February
2002 meeting. As of February 2002, the Model Rules have been amended to reflect the
Ethics 2000 recommendations. However, the Model Rules retain their traditional title,
with a new date-Model Rules of Professional Conduct (2002).
26 Yam, supra note 16, at 228.
27 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 3 (2002) ("In addition to
these representational functions, a lawyer may serve as a third-party neutral, a
nonrepresentational role helping the parties to resolve a dispute or other matter.").
28 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.4 (2002).
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third-party neutral29 and imposes a duty on a third-party neutral to inform
unrepresented parties that the lawyer is not representing them.30 While other
minor changes relating to ADR are sprinkled throughout the newly revised
Model Rules, 31 they are still a "model." Individual jurisdictions must now
determine which, if any, of the new provisions they will ultimately adopt.32
The lesson of the struggle for third-party neutral inclusion into the
Model Rules to collaborative lawyering is simple. Even the most basic
recognition of the reconceptualization of lawyer roles away from the
adversarial advocate to the nonrepresentational lawyer-neutral is taking a
long time.33 Indeed, there is still debate over whether lawyers acting as
29 The new rule defines a third-party neutral as follows:
A lawyer serves as a third-party neutral when the lawyer assists two or more
persons who are not clients of the lawyer to reach resolution of a dispute or other
matter that has arisen between them. Service as a third-party neutral may include
service as an arbitrator, a mediator or in such other capacity as will enable the
lawyer to assist the parties resolve the matter.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.4(a) (2002).
30 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.4(b) (2002). The comments to Rule
2.4 are more catch-all and include recognition that lawyer-neutrals may be subject to
various codes of ethics, such as the AAA/ABA Code of Ethics for Arbitrators. Id. at cmt.
2. Additionally, the comments note that conflicts of interest are addressed in new Rule
1.12 and candor to the tribunal in new Rule 3.3. Id. at cmts. 4, 5.
31 For example, changes were also made to Rules 1.4, 1.12, 3.3 and 4.1. See infra
notes 71 (describing changes to Rules 1.4 and 1.12), 108-14 and accompanying text
(describing changes to Rules 3.3 and 4.1).
32 More than forty states are already reviewing or preparing to review their
respective state rules in light of the 2002 changes to the Model Rules. Mark Hansen,
Smooth Sailing, ABA J., Oct. 2002, at 69. Virginia, however, is ahead of the pack. It
already has adopted specific rules relating to third-party neutrals and mediators. See VA.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.10 (third-party neutrals), R. 2.11 (mediators) (2002).
33 Clearly, there is widespread use of lawyers serving as third-party neutrals and the
ethical rules regarding representational roles do not apply to their nonrepresentational
ones. Silences, supra note 22, at 637-38. Recognition, however, remains slow. Consider
the problem presented by the new Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers released
in 2000 by the American Law Institute. This two-volume work is a major piece of legal
scholarship that goes well beyond the scope of either the Model Code or Model Rules.
However, the Restatement fails to address issues relating to alternative dispute resolution,
especially third-party neutrals. See id. at 638-39 (arguing that the Restatement fails to
include any definition or conception of lawyers as arbitrators, mediators, early neutral
evaluators, or representatives or advocates within these dispute resolution formats). But
see Hazard, supra note 22, at 671 (contending that the Restatement is not silent, but
speaks in more general terms). While there is some mention of ADR in the Restatement,
it is generally limited to issues such as attorney-client fee disputes and malpractice.
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neutrals are "practicing law" and thereby subject to lawyer ethical codes at
all.34 While the recognition of third-party neutrals in the Model Rules is a
step in the right direction, even this falls short of expectations. 35 The stand-
alone nature of new Rule 2.4, however, shows some willingness to embrace
unique rules for ADR participants. With this context, it is not surprising to
me that Lawrence and Beckwith/Slovin disagree on the need for ethical
guidelines for the new collaborative lawyer.
Imagine a spectrum with a lawyer representing a client in litigation at
one extreme and a judge presiding over the dispute at the other. There is no
question that different ethical standards govern the litigator and the judge.
Add a third-party neutral to the spectrum. The neutral would lie close to, if
not on, the judicial end of the spectrum. Hence, it makes sense that ethical
guidelines different from the advocate and more similar to the judge should
control. Despite this conceptually easier application of the need for different
ethical rules for neutrals, such recognition is still not universal. As we move
farther in on the ethical spectrum, as with collaborative lawyering, resistance
to new rules intensifies. The ethical treatment of party-appointed arbitrators,
considered in the next section, illustrates this.
B. Domestic Arbitration and the Party-Appointed Problem
If the ethical orientation of third-party neutrals is the "easier" question,
the ethical posture of the party-appointed arbitrator introduces a hard twist.
Should party-appointed arbitrators be held to lesser ethical standards than
their neutral colleagues? Currently, certain ethical codes for domestic
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 42 cmt. b(iv) ("In many
jurisdictions, fee-arbitration procedures entitle any client to obtain arbitration... "), 54
cmt. b ("A client and lawyer may agree in advance... to arbitrate claims for legal
malpractice... ") (2000); see also Silences, supra note 22, at 647-48.
34 See New Wine, supra note 15, at 940-41 (noting the continuing debate about
whether lawyer-neutrals are practicing law and subject to the ethical considerations
governing lawyers).
35 See Robert F. Cochran Jr., Professional Rules and ADR: Control of Alternative
Dispute Resolution Under the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission Proposal and Other
Professional Responsibility Standards, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 895, 906-09 (2001)
(arguing Ethics 2000 changes to Model Rules fall short and undermine client influence
over ADR decisions); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in ADR: The Many "Cs" of
Professional Responsibility and Dispute Resolution, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 979, 984-87
(2001) [hereinafter Many Cs] (describing where Ethics 2000 falls short with respect to
ADR); Yarn, supra note 16, at 260 (noting Ethics 2000 took a "very conservative
approach" and "did little to promote ADR or change lawyer behavior").
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arbitration create dual ethical responsibilities for party-appointed arbitrators
and third-party neutrals on tripartite panels. 36 The duality of these codes is
simple; they impose the highest standards of impartiality and fairness on a
neutral arbitrator while permitting predisposition toward the nominating
party by a party-appointed arbitrator. Criticism of this "party-appointed
problem" and the current moves to correct it further inform the discussion of
collaborative lawyer ethics.
The widely used37 AAA/ABA Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in
Commercial Disputes embodies this duality and squarely presents the party-
appointed problem in that it requires that "persons who have the power to
decide should observe fundamental standards of ethical conduct. '38 To
ensure broad public confidence, an arbitrator has a responsibility, not only to
the parties but also to the process itself, to observe high standards of conduct
preserving the integrity and fairness of the process. 39 This requires arbitrator
independence and precludes predisposition.40 However, these ethical
obligations are diluted if one is a nonneutral party-appointed arbitrator. 41
Nonneutrals "may be predisposed toward the party who appointed them but
in all other respects are obligated to act in good faith with integrity and
fairness. '42 While the nonneutral still must act in good faith and with
integrity and fairness, the specific prohibitions of the Code of Ethics-
delaying tactics, harassment of witnesses, or making knowingly untrue or
36 See AAA/ABA, Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes Canon
VII (1977) [hereinafter Code of Ethics] (creating exceptions from canons for nonneutral
party-appointed arbitrators), 1998 WL 1527121, available at www.adr.org; JAMS, Ethics
Guidelines for Arbitrators, Guideline X (2002) (creating exceptions from ethical
guidelines for nonneutral arbitrators), available at http://www.jamsadr.com/
ETHICS for arbs.asp.
37 Feerick, supra note 23, at 907.
38 Code of Ethics, supra note 36, at pmbl. para. 3.
39 Id. at Canon I(A).
40 See id. at Canon V(B) ("An arbitrator should decide all matters justly, exercising
independent judgment, and should not permit outside pressure to affect the decision.").
41 Technically, the Code of Ethics sets a series of canons applying to all arbitrators.
Canon VII, entitled "Ethical Considerations Relating to Arbitrators Appointed by One
Party," then creates exceptions that apply to nonneutral party-appointed arbitrators.
Significantly, the Code of Ethics establishes a presumption that party-appointed
arbitrators are nonneutral. Id. at Canon VII Introductory Note.
42 Id. at Canon VII(A)(1); see id. at Canon VII(E)(1) ("Nonneutral arbitrators are
permitted to be predisposed toward deciding in favor of the party who appointed them.").
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misleading statements-punctuate the difference in standards. 43 Thus, the
Code of Ethics prescribes one form of treatment for the neutral and a
different, lesser standard for the nonneutral party-appointed arbitrator.
This fundamentally different ethical treatment also manifests in different
disclosure and ex parte communication requirements. Under the Code of
Ethics, before accepting appointment, arbitrators should disclose: (1) direct
or indirect financial or personal interest in the outcome of the arbitration and
(2) any existing or past financial, business, professional, family or social
relationships which are likely to affect impartiality or may reasonably create
the appearance of bias.44 In contrast, nonneutral party-appointed arbitrators
essentially have a one time, general disclosure requirement. The disclosure
"should be sufficient to describe the general nature and scope of any interest
or relationship, but need not include as detailed information as is expected
from persons appointed as neutral arbitrators." 45 Significantly, nonneutral
arbitrators are not obliged to withdraw if requested. 46
But the true "hallmark"47 of the nonneutral party-appointed arbitrator is
the ability to engage in ex parte communication. As a general rule, a neutral
arbitrator should not discuss a case with any party in the absence of the
others.48 Nonneutral party-appointed arbitrators, however, may communicate
with their nominating party about any part of the case provided they first
43 Id. at Canon VII(A)(1). By specifically identifying and prohibiting these actions,
but not more, the Code of Ethics appears to set this as the boundary for fairness and
integrity as applied to the party-appointed arbitrator. See Deseriee A. Kennedy,
Predisposed with Integrity: The Elusive Quest for Justice in Tripartite Arbitrations, 8
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 749, 762-63 (1995).
44 Code of Ethics, supra note 36, at Canon II(A). This includes disclosure of such
relationships with any party, lawyer, or witness and extends to relationships involving
members of their families or current employers, partners or business associates. Id.
45 Id. at Canon VII(B)(1). The JAMS ethical guidelines do not require a nonneutral
arbitrator to make any disclosure of actual or potential conflicts. See JAMS, Ethics
Guidelines for Arbitrators, Guideline X (2002).
46 Code of Ethics, supra note 36, at Canon VII(B)(2). In contrast, if requested to
withdraw by one of the parties, the neutral arbitrator should do so, unless the parties'
agreement establishes procedures for challenges, or the arbitrator determines the
challenge is not substantial. See id. at Canon 1I(E). Given this standard, it is not
surprising that judicial inquiry into a neutral's conduct often focuses on nondisclosure
issues that might reveal impartiality; nonneutrals, who are expected to have relationships,
rarely provide a basis to vacate an arbitral award. See Kennedy, supra note 43, at 763
(describing the difference in judicial inquiry into neutral and nonneutral conduct).
47 Kennedy, supra note 43, at 764.
48 Code of Ethics, supra note 36, at Canon Ill(B).
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inform the other participants that they intend to engage in ex parte
communication; content need not be disclosed.49 This ability is considered
by many participants as one of the key benefits of arbitration. 50
Proponents of this system of nonneutral party-appointed arbitrators
contend that it has numerous benefits. It ensures that the party has a
champion on the panel to serve as an effective advocate.51 It allows for
selection of an arbitrator familiar with the industry and with relationships to
it thereby increasing the expertise of the decision makers.52 Additionally, the
very fact of party participation ensures greater support for both the process
of arbitration and the result.53
However, the nonneutral party-appointed arbitrator-unique to domestic
arbitration54-is under fire. Calling this system everything from "a stepsister
of dubious integrity"55 to an "embarrassment," 56 critics argue that because a
party-appointed arbitrator is less constrained by the ethical rules, the
arbitrator is free to act less impartially, yielding a decision tainted by
partiality.57 Given that the arbitrator's role is pivotal to the entire process
and that commercial arbitration forms a significant part of our justice
49 Id. at Canon VII(C)(2).
50 See Kennedy, supra note 43, at 764.
51 See id. at 762 (describing advocacy as a reason for arbitrator choice); John P.
McMahon, The Role of Party-Appointed Arbitrators-The Sunkist Case, 49 DISP. RESOL.
J. 66, 66 (1994) (noting "that an attorney who does not choose an arbitrator who will
champion the client's case and prepare the arbitrator to do so is not fulfilling a duty to the
client and that a party-appointed arbitrator who does not advocate the appointing party's
position is not doing his job.").
52 See Kennedy, supra note 43, at 763 (describing proponents' view that experience
and relationships improve competency); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American
Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 425, 435-36 (1988) (describing the advantages of expertise and
knowledge).
53 See Kennedy, supra note 43, at 759 (noting proponents argument that tripartite
arbitrations provide even greater control than other forms of ADR); Stipanowich, supra
note 52, at 437 (commenting that the party-appointed process may "stimulate greater
faith in the process and lessen the chance of appeal").
54 See Stephen K. Huber, The Role of Arbitrator: Conflicts of Interest, 28 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 915, 925 (2001) (labeling the party-appointed arbitrator as "unique to
American arbitration").
55 Robert H. Smit, The Newly Revised CPR Rules for Non-Administered Arbitration
of International Disputes, 18 J. INT'L ARB. 59, 67 (2001).
56 James H. Carter, Improving Life with the Party-Appointed Arbitrator: Clearer
Conduct Guidelines for "Nonneutrals," 11 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 295, 305 (2000).
57 See Kennedy, supra note 43, at 764 ("The Code of Ethics provides few barriers
between the predisposed party-selected arbitrator and a decision tainted by partiality.").
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system, the highest standards of ethical conduct should be imposed on all
arbitrators. 58 Judicial reluctance to reexamine arbitral awards based on
party-appointed arbitrator conduct reinforces the need for the highest ethical
standards.59 The dual ethical approach is also criticized as inconsistent and
incompatible with international arbitration rules. International arbitration
rules uniformly reject two-tiered ethical burdens for party-appointed and
neutral arbitrators. 60 Even the AAA's own International Arbitration Rules
58 See id. at 768 (advocating higher ethical standards to ensure the integrity of the
process).
59 See id. at 768-87 (outlining the refusal of courts to intervene in the arbitral
process). Consider Delta Mine Holding Co. v. AFC Coal Props., Inc., 280 F.3d 815 (8th
Cir. 2001). Following a tripartite arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),
AFC Coal sought to vacate the arbitration award because a nonneutral party-appointed
arbitrator had an on-going consulting relationship with Delta Mine and its attorneys,
participated in pre-hearing preparation of Delta Mine's case, and had ex parte
communications with Delta Mine's attorneys during deliberations. Id. at 819. The district
court agreed and held that the nonneutral's conduct violated the Code of Ethics,
justifying vacating the award under the FAA's "evident partiality" standard. Id. at 820.
The Eighth Circuit reversed on the grounds that the arbitration agreement contemplated
the selection of partial arbitrators and that disclosure of a "client consultant relationship"
was sufficient. Id. at 820-22. Delta Mine illustrates a substantial judicial tolerance for
partisan, party-appointed arbitrators. See also Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist
Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753, 756-59 (11th Cir. 1993) (finding that a nonneutral party-
appointed arbitrator did not violate the Code of Ethics "good faith" standard where the
arbitrator helped the party prepare its case and published views on issues involved in the
dispute prior to the arbitration).
60 See Carter, supra note 56, at 299 ("Prominent rules in international arbitrations
provide expressly that all arbitrators, including those appointed by parties, must be
impartial and independent.").
In 1986, nearly a decade after the joint AAA-ABA effort produced the Code of
Ethics, the International Bar Association (IBA) adopted ethical guidelines. Int'l Bar
Ass'n, Ethics for Int'l Arbitrators (1986), available at 26 I.L.M. 583 (1987). The IBA's
ethical guidelines diverge from the Code of Ethics and take the approach that the same
ethical standards should control all arbitrators, regardless of the appointment method.
The IBA starts with a fundamental rule: "Arbitrators shall proceed diligently and
efficiently to provide the parties with a just and effective resolution of their disputes, and
shall be and shall remain free from bias." Id. at art. 1. The IBA requires disclosure of all
facts or circumstances that may give rise to justifiable doubts as to a prospective
arbitrator's impartiality or independence. Id. at art. 4.1. Regarding ex parte
communications, the IBA requires that "an arbitrator should avoid any unilateral
communications regarding the case with any party, or its representatives." Id. at art. 5.3.
Effective January 1998, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) established
its set of arbitration rules. Int'l Chamber of Commerce, Rules of Arbitration of the Int'l
Chamber of Commerce (1998), available at http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/
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reject the distinction. 61 Consequently, the uniquely domestic dual approach
should give way to a harmonized and higher ethical burden consistent with
the international models.62
Reformers may be getting their wish. Currently underway is a joint
project involving the ABA, AAA, and CPR to revise the Code of Ethics and
create a unified code applicable to both domestic and international
arbitration/rules.asp. These rules require that, "[e]very arbitrator must be and remain
independent of the parties involved in the arbitration." Id. at art. 7, § 1. To this end, all
prospective arbitrators must sign a written statement of independence and disclosure and
submit it to the Secretariat of the International Court of Arbitration (the ICC's arbitration
body) disclosing any facts or circumstances which might call into question the
arbitrator's independence in the eyes of the parties. Id. at art. 7, § 2. The Secretary
General then confirms party-appointed arbitrators, provided they have filed a statement of
independence without qualification or a qualified statement of independence that has not
given rise to objections. Id. at art. 9, § 2. There are provisions to challenge an arbitrator
for lack of independence with the ultimate decision resting with the Court. Id. at art. 11,
§§ 1-3.
In 2000, the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution (CPR) revised its Rules for Non-
Administered Arbitration of international disputes. CPR Inst. for Disp. Resol., Rules for
Non-Administered Arbitration (2000), available at http://www.cpradr.org/arb-rules.htm.
These rules also require that "[e]ach arbitrator shall be independent and impartial." Id. at
R. 7.1. Arbitrators are required to disclose in writing "any circumstance that might give
rise to justifiable doubt regarding the arbitrator's independence." Id. at R. 7.3. Provisions
exist for challenge of all arbitrators for lack of independence or impartiality, with the
ultimate decision by a neutral organization. Id. at R. 7.5-7.8. Ex parte communication is
also prohibited, except general discussions about the controversy and a candidate's
qualifications, independence, or impartiality. Id. at R. 7.4.
61 The International Centre for Dispute Resolution, a division of the AAA, has
issued its own arbitration rules. Int'l Centre for Dispute Resolution, Int'l Arbitration
Rules (2001), available at www.adr.org. Unlike the domestic Code of Ethics, the
International Arbitration Rules do not promote separate ethical standards for neutrals and
party-appointed arbitrators. All arbitrators "shall be impartial and independent" and
disclose any circumstance likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to impartiality or
independence. Id. at art. 7, § 1. Additionally, no party shall have ex parte
communications with any arbitrator, or candidate for party-appointed arbitrator, except to
advise of the general nature of the controversy, the anticipated proceedings, and discuss
qualifications, availability, or independence. Id. at art. 7, § 2.
62 See Carter, supra note 56, at 305 (calling for a revised code of ethics that seeks
consensus with the international codes by defining and limiting nonneutrals); Kennedy,
supra note 43, at 787-90 (advocating reform of tripartite arbitration by requiring the
highest ethical standards modeled after the Code of Judicial Conduct).
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commercial arbitration. 63 Resolving the party-appointed problem is one of
the major tasks of this reform effort.64 Representatives of the three groups
reached tentative agreement at the ABA's annual conference in August
2002.65 The new guidelines, called the "Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in
Domestic and International Commercial Disputes," are still a working draft
and unfinalized.66 While the most recent draft has not been publicly
circulated, it reportedly includes the following: a "neutral presumption" that
the default status of an arbitrator is one of neutrality, no ex parte
communications absent consent of the other party, and required disclosures
for "partisan" 67 arbitrators mirroring those of neutrals.68
What does this mean for collaborative lawyering? In a parallel form of
dispute resolution, a party representative is currently allowed and expected
to be an advocate. The ethical problems raised by these standards, especially
those concerning the process of arbitration, have been increasingly
scrutinized and challenged. It now appears as if the domestic arbitration
community itself is prepared to hold even party-appointed arbitrators to
higher standards more in line with those widely recognized for neutrals.69
There are, of course, differences, such as the long-standing ethical
requirement that even nonneutral party-appointed arbitrators must decide
disputes with good faith, fairness, and integrity.70 However, the trend away
from advocacy toward neutrality is instructive.
63 See Agreement Near on Code of Ethics for Commercial Arbitrators (Aug. 14,
2002) (describing the status of the effort), at http://www.adrworld.con/
opendocument.asp?Doc=kRsJfSGOwC&code=Tzd6d8pk [hereinafter Agreement].
64 Feerick, supra note 23, at 909.
65 Agreement, supra note 63.
66 Id. Following finalization, it will then be circulated to interested ABA sections
before forwarding it to the ABA House of Delegates next summer.
67 See id. (reporting agreement to call nonneutral party-appointed arbitrators
"partisan").
68 See id. (reporting agreement on neutral presumption and no ex parte
communication absent consent); Feerick, supra note 23, at 921 (noting working draft
contains parallel disclosures for all arbitrators).
69 The trend is certainly not universal. The newly revised Model Rule 1.12 retains a
conflicts provision that "[a]n arbitrator selected as a partisan of a party in a multimember
arbitration panel is not prohibited from subsequently representing that party." MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.12 (2002). This retention is another criticism of Ethics
2000. See Many C's, supra note 35, at 986 (criticizing the partisan arbitrator rule).
70 See Code of Ethics, supra note 36, at Canon VII(A)(1). Interestingly, this may not
be such a significant difference given collaborative law's good faith requirement. See
Lawrence, supra note 1, at 436 (describing good faith discovery procedures with
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C. Lawyer Representatives in Mediation
While there may be a trend toward reassessing the ethical standards
applicable to party-appointed arbitrators and third-party neutrals (both
arbitrators and mediators), what about party representatives in mediation?
Even the newly revised Model Rules are silent as to ethical guidance for the
lawyer representing a party in mediation.71 This silence, however, should not
collaborative law); Reynolds & Tennant, supra note 1, at 12 (noting that in collaborative
law the parties agree to act in good faith).
71 See James Alfini, E2K Leaves Mediation in an Ethics "Black Hole," DISP.
RESOL. MAG., Spring 2001, at 3 [hereinafter E2K] (pointing out this "glaring deficiency"
in Ethics 2000); New Wine, supra note 15, at 951 (noting the absence of modifications
addressing the ADR representative lawyer in Ethics 2000). Aside from the recognition of
third-party neutrals in the preamble and new Model Rule 2.4, discussed supra notes 26-
30 and accompanying text, the only other changes relevant to mediation involve the duty
to advise and conflicts. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2, 1.4, 1.12, 2.1
(2002).
Arguably, the new Model Rules slightly strengthen the duty to advise clients about
ADR options. Three areas are relevant. First, Model Rule 1.2 concerning the allocation of
authority between client and lawyer is amended to require a lawyer to "abide by a client's
decisions concerning objectives of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall
consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued." MODEL RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2002). New Model Rule 1.4 relating to communication is
completely redrafted to specifically outline a lawyer's duty to do the following: promptly
inform of decisions or circumstance's involving informed consent, consult about means,
inform about the status of the matter, comply with requests for information, and consult
about limitations on the lawyer's conduct. Id. at R. 1.4(a)(1)-(5). However, there is no
specific reference to ADR. The lawyer's duty to "reasonably consult with the client about
the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished" is the most likely
source of an attorney's duty to inform concerning ADR options. Id. at R. 1.2(a). Finally,
while Rule 2.1 remains unchanged, the comments include a new sentence: "Similarly,
when a matter is likely to involve litigation, it may be necessary under Rule 1.4 to inform
the client of forms of dispute resolution that might constitute reasonable alternatives to
litigation." Id. at R. 2.1 cmt. 5. Taken as a whole, these changes may enhance the duty to
advise. However, the changes have been challenged as "weak" due to the lack of specific
guidance, weak use of language, and poor location. See Cochran, supra note 35, at 908-
09 (describing weaknesses). But cf Rogers & McEwen, supra note 16, at 862-63
(contending that the placement of an ethical duty to advise is less important than whether
such a duty is even advisable).
Additionally, Model Rule 1.12 is amended to include mediators or other third-party
neutrals to the preexisting former judge or arbitrator rule. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.12(a) (2002). The gist of the rule remains the same-a lawyer who
participated personally and substantially in a matter as a judge, arbitrator, or other third-
party neutral shall not represent anyone in connection with the matter, absent informed
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be taken as consensus that current ethical codes provide sufficient answers. 72
To the contrary, as readers of this Journal already know, there is an emerging
debate on the appropriate ethical behavior of lawyer-representatives in
mediation and the need-for ethical codes for lawyers to provide guidance. 73
These discussions further illuminate the Lawrence-Beckwith/Slovin
colloquy.
In a 1999 issue of this Journal, Professor Jean Stemlight surveyed the
literature of how attorneys represent clients in mediation.74 She concluded
that essentially two camps emerged: one arguing that advocacy has a limited
role in mediation and the other arguing for active advocacy.75 This division
remains. There are those-such as Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow and
Professor Kimberlee Kovach-who lament the stranglehold the adversarial
model has on lawyer ethics, criticize this ethic of zeal as incompatible with
mediation, and call for new ethical rules to guide lawyer behavior. 76 Others
consent in writing from all parties. Id. The rule also places limitations on negotiation for
employment and includes screening procedures. Id. at R. 1.12(b), (c).
72 State-adopted lawyer ethics codes are not the only source for ethical guidelines in
mediation. The vast majority of states have also enacted legislation to afford
confidentiality in mediation. 1 SARAH R. COLE, NANCY H. ROGERS, & CRAIG A.
MCEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY, PRACTICE § 9:1, at 9-3 (2d ed. 2001). However, in
many jurisdictions legislatures have given little weight to the need and effect of increased
confidentiality. Id. § 9:33, at 9-82. For a comprehensive examination of mediation
confidentiality and its application to federal mediation, see Ellen E. Deason, Predictable
Mediation Confidentiality in the US. Federal System, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL.
239 (2002).
73 See Jean R. Stermlight, Lawyers' Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using
Economics and Psychology to Structure Advocacy in a Nonadversarial Setting, 14 OHIO
ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 269, 278-90 (1999) (surveying the recent literature on the role of
attorney advocacy in mediation); see also James J. Alfini, Settlement Ethics and
Lawyering in ADR Proceedings: A Proposal to Revise Rule 4.1, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
255, 265 (1999) [hereinafter Settlement Ethics] (noting the emerging literature on the role
of lawyer-representatives in mediation).
74 Sternlight, supra note 73.
75 Id. at 276-90.
76 See Ethics, supra note 22, at 426-29, 452-53 (discussing the inappropriateness of
zealous advocacy for ADR representatives and suggesting development of a
nonadversarial ethics code); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and Professionalism in Non-
Adversarial Lawyering, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 153, 161-66 (1999) [hereinafter
Professionalism] (describing the proliferation of new roles for lawyer-representatives in
ADR and proposing a new, nonadversarial aspirational code); New Wine, supra note 15,
at 951-53, 959-72 (describing the disconnect between the adversarial paradigm and
mediation and advancing a separate, nonadversarial code of ethical considerations);
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concur. 77 In contrast, there are advocacy advocates-such as former U.S.
Magistrate John Cooley, Professor Geoffrey Hazard, and I would include
Professor Sternlight-who contend that attorney advocacy is appropriate in
mediation.78 To be sure, there are significant subtleties and differences
advanced by all of these contributors to this mediation ethics conversation.
However, one point is plain: there are both proponents and critics of having
adversarial ethics models applied to lawyer-representatives in mediation.
The positions advanced by Beckwith, Slovin, and Lawrence on
collaborative lawyering reflect this broader debate. Beckwith and Slovin
note as much: "[t]he collaborative format presents ... the same ethical issues
as do mediation and negotiation without a neutral. ' 79 They are also correct
that "a body of comment has developed recognizing the zeal of the lawyer in
mediation." 80 However, the implication that there is consensus on
application of this zealous advocacy standard to lawyer-representatives in
mediation, thereby resolving the question in the collaborative context, is
wrong. Lawrence's position that the collaborative lawyer's ethical
orientation should shift away from pure advocacy 8' is entirely consistent
with the position of those criticizing a zealous advocacy standard and calling
Kimberlee K. Kovach, Lawyer Ethics in Mediation: Time for a Requirement of Good
Faith, Disp. RESOL. MAG., Winter 1997, at 9, 9-10 (noting the continued and
inappropriate adversariness in mediation and calling for a new good faith requirement);
Good Faith, supra note 22, at 604, 622-23 (denouncing the adversarial model's use in
mediation and detailing a recommended good faith requirement); see also COLE ET AL.,
supra note 72 (2d ed. Supp. 2001), § 4.11, at 3 ("Some commentators advocate adoption
of ethical rules to guide lawyers' behavior in mediation .... ).
77 See E2K, supra note 71, at 3 (finding mediation lying and gamesmanship
"troubling" and calling for creation of a new ethics infrastructure); Settlement Ethics,
supra note 73, at 266-70 (same).
78 See John W. Cooley, Mediator & Advocate Ethics, Disp. RESOL. J., Feb. 2000, at
73, 75 (stating that in mediation a lawyer has an ethical duty of advocacy of the client's
interests and applying the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct relating to lawyer
conduct in negotiations); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., When ADR Is Ancillary to a Legal
Practice, Law Firms Must Confront Conflicts Issues, 12 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST
LITIG. 147, 147 (1994) (contending that a lawyer acting on behalf of a party in mediation
"has a role analogous to that of an advocate in litigation" and is governed by the Model
Rules); Sternlight, supra note 73, at 291-97 (arguing that attorney advocacy is entirely
consistent with mediation yet stressing that using certain zealous litigation tactics may be
poor advocacy in the context of mediation).
79 Beckwith & Slovin, supra note 6, at 503.
80 Id.
81 Lawrence, supra note 1, at 442.
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for new nonadversarial ethics standards for lawyer-representatives in
mediation.82
III. WHY NEW HATS ARE NECESSARY
The current trend to reevaluate the ethical standards applied to lawyers
as ADR participants-such as, third-party neutrals, nonneutral arbitrators,
and mediation party-representatives-provide context for the dialogue
started by Lawrence and Beckwith/Slovin on the ethics of collaborative
lawyering. While this conversation is just beginning, there are signs that
point toward the merits of departing from the traditional, general ethical
standards applicable to lawyers. Briefly consider the following.
A. The Paradigm Shift
Central to the process of collaborative law is a paradigm shift away from
a traditional adversarial model to a problem-solving model.83 The win-lose
dynamic is replaced with essentially a team approach.8 4 This shift is
embodied in the collaborative lawyer's agreement to avoid litigation, engage
in good faith questions and answers, and participate in four-way
conferences.8 5 These structural process changes are designed to encourage
attorneys to work cooperatively and creatively while empowering clients to
play an active role in resolving their own disputes.86 Attorneys who succeed
82 See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
83 Reynolds & Tennant, supra note 1, at 12; see New Wine, supra note 15, at 975
(discussing the distinct differences between litigation and collaboration); Chip Rose,
Collaborative Concepts (Mar. 2002) (noting that professionals have embraced the
paradigm shift), at http://www.mediate.com/collaborativelaw/editrose2.cfin (last visited
Nov. 21, 2002).
84 See New Wine, supra note 15, at 975 (describing the team approach of problem
solving with collaborative law); Laflin, supra note 22, at 480-81 (describing winner and
loser characteristic of adversarial litigation).
'85 See Lawrence, supra note 1, at 433-36 (outlining components of collaborative
law); see also Arnold, supra note 2; Arnold, supra note 11, at 383-89.
86 See William F. Coyne, Jr., The Case for Settlement Counsel, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON
DisP. RESOL. 367, 401 (1999) (detailing the collaborative law process and noting that it
"has been found to reduce both contentiousness and cost"); Lawrence, supra note 1, at
433-34 (explaining how collaborative law encourages attorney and client cooperation
and legitimization of interests); Chip Rose, Introduction to Collaborative Negotiating, at
http://www.mediate.com/articles/rose3.cfi (last visited Nov. 21, 2002) (describing
collaborative law's attention to the process and outcome needs of clients).
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in collaborative law must make the mental shift from the inherently
competitive adversarial approach to one focusing on the needs of the
parties. 87
Ethical rules borrowed from the adversarial model-such as zealous
advocacy-seem ill-suited to this paradigm shift. This is certainly the lesson
in other ADR contexts. When a lawyer engages in the nonrepresentational
role of a neutral, the Model Rules now recognize that different ethical rules
should apply.88 Even when the lawyer is selected as a party-representative,
the trend in tripartite arbitration is to hold the party-appointed arbitrator to
standards more akin to a neutral than those of a party advocate. 89
Additionally, the call for abandoning the ethics of advocacy as applied to
lawyer mediation-participants and creating nonadversarial codes provides a
close parallel to collaborative lawyering.90 In fact, collaborative lawyering
presents an even stronger case for its own nonadversarial ethics standards
than mediation given the team orientation and "powerful problem-solving
potential" at the core of collaborative law.91
To be sure, there are ways to shoehorn the process of collaborative law
into traditional lawyer ethical codes. Lawrence himself recognizes that
collaborative law's goals of avoiding litigation, withdrawal if unsuccessful,
and good faith questions and answers could exist under traditional codes
given the right interpretation.92 Beckwith and Slovin note the same.93 Other
commentators similarly observe the potential coexistence with traditional
ethics provisions. 94
87 See Rose, supra note 86 (contending that a mental shift is necessary for success).
88 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 3, R. 2.4 (2002); see supra notes
26-30 and accompanying text (discussing inclusion).
89 See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text (describing trend).
90 See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text (explaining the position of critics
of adversarial ethics in mediation).
91 Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Law: What It Is & Why Family Attorneys Need
To Know About It, at http://www.collaborativefamilylawofutah.com/articles/
whatandwhy.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2002); see Professionalism, supra note 76, at 161
(noting that commentators suggest that different lawyer roles in collaborative law warrant
separate rules).
92 See Lawrence, supra note 1, at 442-44.
93 See Beckwith & Slovin, supra note 6, at 502.
94 See Reynolds & Tennant, supra note 1, at 28 (discussing ethical considerations
with collaborative law and applying the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct);
D. Todd Sholar, Note, Collaborative Law-A Method for the Madness, 23 MEM. ST. U.
L. REV. 667, 675-80 (1993) (describing compatibility of collaborative law with the
Model Code).
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Even "zealous advocacy" could be interpreted to include collaborative
law by determining that the client's needs are best served by a collaborative,
as opposed to adversarial, model.95 This, however, seems unsatisfactory. It
could be the notion of trying to equate cooperative problem solving with
"zealotry" that is unsettling.96 Maybe it is reluctance to anchor collaborative
law to an ethical concept that is subject to such extreme interpretations
including "hired gun," "Rambo," and "gladiator." 97 Given the distinct
paradigm shift, new clearer standards would provide superior guidance for
the collaborative lawyer.
B. The (Non)Duty of Candor
The precise contours of what the ethical standards should be for
collaborative lawyers are beyond the scope of this Comment. Beckwith and
Slovin, however, identify the "appropriate level of candor" as the major
ethical issue in collaborative law.98 This is a fine starting point. They
contend that the ethical issue is the same as presented in mediation or
negotiation with the exception of collaborative lawyers' agreement to
provide good faith answers to good faith questions. 99 Therefore,
collaborative lawyers should look to mediation and negotiation to determine
the appropriate level of candor required.' 00 This, however, is unhelpful. The
Model Rules provide poor, if any, guidance as to the lawyer's duty of candor
in mediation.
95 See Beckwith & Slovin, supra note 6, at 498; Reynolds & Tennant, supra note 1,
at 28 (applying duty of zealous representation through interpretation); Rack, supra note
1, at 9 (noting concern over zealousness, but concluding that collaborative law is
consistent if the client consents); Sholar, supra note 94, at 677-80 (interpreting and
applying the Model Code's zealous representation standard).
96 See New Wine, supra note 15, at 950 ("This zealotry, however, has been
exaggerated to the extent that some contend it gives rise to an unworkable view of the
lawyer's task.").
97 See Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter's Commentary on the Professionalism Crusade,
74 TEx. L. REv. 259, 304 (1995) (describing the hired gun and Rambo analogies); New
Wine, supra note 15, at 950 (noting Rambo approach); Tesler, supra note 91 (describing
the gladiator model); see generally Sternlight, supra note 73, at 291-97 (examining
different conceptualizations of advocacy in mediation).
98 Beckwith & Slovin, supra note 6, at 501.
99 Id. at 501-02.
100 Id. at 503.
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Lawyers lie. 101 It is not just a few unethical ones at the margins, but "a
permanent feature of advocacy."' 1 2 This is especially true in negotiation
where willingness to lie is "central to one's effectiveness in negotiations."' 10 3
Why? Lies work, or at least that is the common perception. 104 Lying is so
ingrained that we have developed an ethical discourse to support it.105
Hence, "zealous advocacy" means to many lawyers. an obligation to perform
all lawful acts including those the lawyer might consider, unethical. 106 In
other words, "a lawyer is required to be disingenuous."' 107
What then is the guidance the Model Rules provide, to curb this
tendency? There is no specific rule governing mediation conduct. The
provision generally referred to as instructive is Model Rule 4.1,
"Truthfulness in Statements to Others." 10 8 However, Model Rule 4.1 only
prohibits false statements of fact.' 0 9 As applied to negotiation, the comments
have been used to support an exception for "puffery"-a euphemism for
lying. 110 Because this conduct is inconsistent with mediation principles,
101 See generally Gerald Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations, 75 IOWA L.
REV. 1219 (1990) (advancing a comprehensive taxonomy for lawyer lying); Lisa G.
Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 659 (1990) (concluding based upon her
study that lawyer deception of clients is pervasive).
102 Wetlaufer, supra note 101, at 1272.
103 Id.
104 See id. (contending "well-told lies are effective"); cf. Andrea Kupfer Schneider,
Shattering Negotiation Myths: Empirical Evidence on the Effectiveness of Negotiation
Style, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 143 (2002) (arguing that the effective hard-bargainer is a
myth and reporting conclusions from her new empirical study showing that effectiveness
ratings drop for unethical adversarial bargainers).
105 Wetlaufer, supra note 101, at 1272, 1254-65; Jonathan R. Cohen, When People
are the Means: Negotiating With Respect, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 739, 763-64 (2001)
(noting lawyer denial and masking of manipulative conduct).
106 See Wetlaufer, supra note 101, at 1255-57 (describing the argument that zealous
representation permits lying).
10 7 Id. (quoting H. EDWARDS & J. WHITE, PROBLEMS, READINGS, AND MATERIALS
ON THE LAWYER AS NEGOTIATOR 378 (1977)).
108 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2002).
109 Id. at R. 4.1(a).
110 See id. at R. 4.1 cmt. 2 ("Under generally accepted conventions in negotiation,
certain types of statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact."); E2K,
supra note 71, at 3 ("It thus opens the door for what some refer to 'puffery,' and others
as lying, in negotiations."); Cooley, supra note 78, at 75 (noting comments suggest
puffing is permissible and noting the absence of a bright line distinguishing lying); Reed
E. Loder, Moral Truthseeking and the Virtuous Negotiator, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 45,
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ADR advocates sought revision in Ethics 2000 to require a duty of candor to
mediators.' They received virtually nothing. While a true duty of candor
was extended to arbitration in revised Rule 3.3, mediation was excluded.1 12
Mediation proponents did get a word-"ordinarily"--to qualify the comment
in Rule 4.1 on negotiation puffery. 13 This is the "black hole"' 14 of ethical
guidance now controlling candor in mediation.
When the Model Rules are consulted, no duty of candor exists in
mediation. Collaborative lawyering, however, needs such an ethical
infrastructure.1 15 This nonadversarial, consensus-building, problem-solving
approach cries out for an explicit duty of candor. 16 While the good faith
provision might provide some relief, it is limited to questions and answers.
Thus, the "major ethical issue relating to collaborative lawyering" 117 cannot
be adequately resolved by looking at current mediation or negotiation
standards.
C. Why Hats at All?
Collaborative lawyering had its genesis in family law where practitioners
became disgruntled with the adversarial nature of the practice and the belief
that it did more harm than good for their clients. "8 While collaborative law
has expanded out of this field, it continues to attract those who
51 (1994) ("The codes are far less clear regarding the status of false statements made to
opponents in negotiation including whether such statements count as lies at all.").
111 See Bruce E. Meyerson, Telling the Truth in Mediation: Mediator Owed Duty of
Candor, Disp. REsOL. MAG., Winter 1997, at 17 (advocating a duty of candor to
mediators); Settlement Ethics, supra note 73, at 269-72 (proposing revision to Rule 4.1).
112 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(m) (defining tribunal to include
an arbitrator), R. 3.3 cmt. 1 (noting duty is owed to a tribunal) (2002); see also Yam,
supra note 16, at 255-56 (describing a proposal to include other ADR processes and
noting ultimate rejection of the idea).
113 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 2 (2002).
114 E2K, supra note 71, at 3.
115 Cf id. (stating there is a critical need to create an ethics infrastructure to support
settlement culture).
116 See Arnold, supra note 2 (describing the process as collaboration on "all aspects
of the dispute resolution, without secrets from each other"); New Wine, supra note 15, at
951-52 (arguing negotiation standard permitting deception should not be the standard in
mediation given its different characteristics).
117 Beckwith & Slovin, supra note 6, at 501.
118 Reynolds & Tennant, supra note 1, at 27-28; Tesler, supra note 91.
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fundamentally question the adversarial model and seek a cooperative way to
solve problems. 19 Given this, why are ethical rules necessary at all? It
would seem that self-selection would ensure that only like-minded
collaborators would choose this type of practice. If so, a collaborative lawyer
could easily go without an ethical hat or ethically "bare-headed."
While it is comforting to hold to the belief that all lawyers practicing
collaborative lawyering follow a similar personal ethics, this is unrealistic.
As Professor Menkel-Meadow laments, "[t]he romantic days of ADR appear
to be over." 120 The success of ADR led to expansion of its use. This, in turn,
led ADR proponents, once content with flexibility and creativity, to call for
ethics and standards. 121 This broader ADR trend is now playing out in
collaborative lawyering.
In only its second decade, collaborative law is predicted to "become
mainstream in a significantly shorter period of time than it has taken for
mediation." 122 This rapid expansion has led collaborative law proponents to
call for uniform standards.123 As more lawyers are exposed to collaborative
lawyering, a new ethical code is needed to both guide lawyers' behavior and
help educate and train new professionals on the ethical principles underlying
the process. 124 The educational function is especially important given the
dramatic paradigm shift embraced by collaborative law. Thus, the best way
to preserve collaborative law's fundamental principles and prepare for future
expansion is with development of its own ethical standards. 125
119 Rack, supra note 1, at 8.
120 Ethics, supra note 22, at 408.
121 See id. (describing Menkel-Meadow's conversion to the need for new rules).
122 Rose, supra note 83.
123 See id. (stating that the best opportunity for success is with a "core of uniform
processes and protocols").
124 See New Wine, supra note 15, at 953-54 (explaining effect of new rules on
lawyer conduct). Dean Nancy Rapoport has set forth a helpful test for determining if new
and distinct ethical rules are warranted in a specific area of legal practice. See generally
Nancy B. Rapoport, Our House, Our Rules: The Need for a Uniform Code of Bankruptcy
Ethics, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 45 (1998). The test includes a baseline assessment of
whether there is a poor fit with general models of ethics, followed by "second order"
questions including: (1) repeat players with novices, (2) jurisdictional layers, (3) ease of
code enactment, and (4) benefits of a single code balanced by disadvantages of
abandoning state regulation. See id. at 65-77. Applying the Rapoport test to mediation,
Professor Kovach concludes that entry of new, inexperienced lawyers to the field justifies
new and distinct rules. See New Wine, supra note 15, at 957-58.
125 There are numerous questions unanswered by this call. Not only must there be
determination of what ethical provisions are warranted, but also whether the separate
standards should be subsumed into Model Rules or exist on a stand alone basis. See New
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IV. CONCLUSION
The conversation about new ethical hats for new collaborative heads is
just beginning. Lawrence, Beckwith and Slovin have done collaborative
lawyering a favor by squarely joining the issue. Undoubtedly, others will
weigh in. Placed in perspective, the ethical concerns present in collaborative
lawyering are already playing out for third-party neutrals, party-appointed
arbitrators, and mediation representatives. Much can be learned from these
related areas. The process of acceptance of the nonrepresentational role of
lawyers as a third-party neutral and ultimate incorporation of a separate
ethical rule in the Model Rules lays the foundation: different ethical rules are
necessary when lawyers function in different roles. Even when the role is
still as a party representative, ethical rules approaching those of the neutral
can be appropriate as the very recent trend in handling party-appointed
arbitrators illustrates. If, as many contend, the adversarial zealous advocacy
standard should not apply to lawyers acting as party representatives in
mediation, collaborative lawyering presents an even more compelling case
for rejection of the standard. Applying these lessons, collaborative lawyers
can best ensure that the core ethical qualities of their discipline continue by
promoting development of separate ethical rules. It is time to don a new hat.
Wine, supra note 15 at 960 (noting options). While transsubstantivity has advantages I
have advocated elsewhere in the context of civil procedure, it appears in this context that
one set of rules for all lawyers may be unworkable given the differences in roles and
ethical burdens. See Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REv. 551,
622-23 (2002) (rejecting heightened pleading in part due to transsubstantivity
advantages).
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